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Women on the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights: Would Equal
Representation Provide More Effective
Remedies?
I. Introduction
The atrocities that took place during the first part of the 20th
century shocked the world into creating a body of international human
rights law.' The human rights violations of World War II made it clear
that international cooperation and unity was necessary to improve the
conditions that existed around the world.2 Europe's response to these
indignities was to form the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter Convention]. 3
The Convention, drafted by the Council of Europe in 1949-1950,'
established not only the most successful system for protection of human
rights, but also one of the most advanced forms of international legal
process .5
The first important achievements of the international community
were the conclusion of bilateral treaties designed to eliminate the slave
trade and establish that human rights fall under the auspices of
international law.6 With the advent of these treaties, international
organizations have been able to outlaw distinctions between citizens
based on qualities such as race, gender, religion, color, political
1. A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 1 (2d ed. 1982). See also David
Weissbrodt & Teresa O'Toole, The Development of International Human Rights Law, in THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1948-1988 - HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 17 (Amnesty International USA 1988). For example, the atrocities
of World War I prompted the creation of the League of Nations. Id. Likewise, the horror of the
Holocaust led to the formation of the United Nations. Id.
2. See Weissbrodt & O'Toole, supra note 1, at 22.
3. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221. [hereinafter Convention].
4. MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1 (1990).
5. Id. See also A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE I (3d ed.
1993).
6. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 15-23. More than 50 bilateral treaties were enacted between
1815 and 1880 in an effort to abolish the slave trade. Id. at 15. These treaties led to additional
international measures to ensure that the slave trade came to an end. Id. at 16. The evolution took
150 years, but resulted in a set of established rules of international law that recognize the right to
freedom of the person, abolish slavery, and prohibit the slave trade. Id. at 16-17. The second
major development of international law was the evolution of humanitarian law and the recognition
of human rights. Id. at 17-19. The third major development relates to the protection of minorities.
ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 19-22.
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philosophy, and national origin. Such discrimination has been declared
against international policy and punishable by an international tribunal.7
Despite these measures, discrimination8 still occurs daily around the
world. Distinctions by race and religion are vehemently attacked by
human rights advocates. However, discrimination based on gender is
often overlooked or considered less of an affront to humanity.9
Nevertheless, women's rights are human rights.'0  Further,
discrimination against women in the international arena has far-reaching
implications. It not only affects women's political rights, but also attacks
their rights to education, privacy, reproduction, marriage, family life,
and physical well-being. Accordingly, these gender-specific rights must
be equated with those concerns traditionally addressed by human rights
advocates. For only in this manner, can the world transform the concept
of human rights to better protect the interests of women.11
This Comment discusses whether a greater female presence would
have a positive impact on women's rights by bringing a wider range of
experiences to the panel of judges on the European Commission and the
Court of Human Rights. Part II of this Comment will explore the
historical background of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Specifically, this part will
discuss the advent of the European Commission of Human Rights
[hereinafter Commission] and the European Court of Human Rights
[hereinafter Court], and their impact on the rights of women. Part III
will consider the feminist perspective in a predominantly patriarchal
international political structure. In an effort to understand why women's
issues have been traditionally overlooked, this part will analyze the
contrast in the legal reasoning of men and women. Finally, Part IV will
illustrate the manner in which the Commission and the Court address the
petitions filed by women versus those filed by men. This part will also
analyze the types of disputes that have a profound effect on women and
argue that a Court and Commission comprised of both male and female
members would better serve the European society.
7. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 3, art. 14; U.N. CHARTER, pmbl.
8. "Discriminate" is commonly used in the pejorative sense as an "unfair, unreasonable,
unjustifiable or arbitrary distinction." WARWICK McKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1983). However, modem international usage recognizes "discrimination"
as conduct which "denies to individuals equality of treatment with other individuals because they
belong to particular groups in society." Id. at 10-11.
9. See Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human
Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486, 486 (1990).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 487.
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II. History
In 1949, the Council of Europe sought to draft a resolution for the
protection of human rights and the prevention of the atrocities witnessed
during World War 11.12 Protection of human rights and respect for the
rule of law were no longer just objectives of the Council, but rather were
made a condition of membership. 3 Consequently, the main purpose of
the Convention was the principle of non-discrimination, which is
embodied in Section 1.14 It was thought that the new commitment to
universal protection of human rights would eliminate the problems which
plagued minorities. 5 Eventually, the parties to the Convention agreed
to use the provisions on non-discrimination and equality set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' 6 However, the drafting
process suffered great delay due to disagreements on the wording of what
was to be article 14."' The first draft provided that "equality before the
law and freedom from discrimination on account of religion, race,
national origin or political or other opinion."" This February 1949
draft omitted any reference to sex or the protection of national
minorities. 9 After extensive debate, both clauses were included in the
12. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 1. See Convention, supra note 3, at 222.
13. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 1. Convention, supra note 3, at 222.
14. See MCKEAN, supra note 8, at 204. Section I of the Convention contains articles 2-18.
Convention, supra note 3, at 224-34.
15. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS - THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLMCAL RIGHTS
5 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS].
16. McKEAN, supra note 8, at 204-07. The Universal Declaration was not conceived as law,
but as "a common standard of achievement" for all to live up to and uphold. THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 9. As a result, the United Nations approved the Declaration
without dissent. Id. In joining the United Nations, every national government agreed to protect
human rights by promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms without distinctions as to race, sex, language, or religion." Weissbrodt & O'Toole, supra
note 1, at 17. The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948. d. See also MCKEAN, supra note 8, at 52-71. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights reads as follows: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A.Res. 217A (I), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doe A/811 (1948).
17. See Digest of Case-Law Relating to the European Convention on Human Rights 1955-1967
(U.G.A. Heule, Belgium 1970). The final text of article 14 reads: "The enjoyment of rights and
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such
as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth, or other status." Convention, supra note 3,
art. 14.
18. McKE N, supra note 8, at 204.
19. Id. at 205. To further illustrate the prevailing attitude of the time, consider the reaction
of Eleanor Roosevelt during the drafting of article I of the Universal Declaration. When it came
time to debate the meaning of historical phrases such as "all men are created equal" and "in the
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final draft of the Convention, however, it still did not guarantee equality
before the law and equal protection of the laws.' This issue will be
discussed more completely in later sections of the Comment.2
Further, until the middle of the 20th century, there had been no
guarantee of human rights at the international level comparable to those
available at the State level. 2 The Convention permits each country to
maintain their right to determine the means by which the guaranteed
freedoms are exercised within their boundaries. However, national
legislation may not undermine the purposes of the Convention or make
distinctions based on the criteria set out in Section L' The final draft
of the Convention was signed on November 4, 1950 and came into effect
on September 3, 1953, when it was ratified by eight countries.24
In order to both ensure that its purposes would be carried out and
grant legitimacy to its ideals, the Convention, through article 19,'
created two bodies: (1) the European Commission of Human Rights26
spirit of brotherhood," Mrs. Roosevelt added that "it had become customary to say 'manhood' and
mean both men and women without differentiation" and that "the word 'men' used in this sense was
generally accepted to include all human beings." Johannes Morsink, Women's Rights in the
Universal Declaration, 13 HUM. RTs. Q. 229, 233-34 (1991).
20. McKEAN, supra note 8, at 208.
21. See infra part IV.
22. JANIS & KAY, supra note 4, at 9.
23. McKEAN, supra note 8, at 205; Convention, supra note 3. art. 17. Section I, article 17
of the Convention provides:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the Convention.
Id.
24. JANIS & KAY, supra note 4, at 1. The Convention was ratified on September 3, 1953 by
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. Id. The following countries were bound by the Convention as of January 1,
1990: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San
Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Id.
25. Article 19 of the Convention provides:
To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties
in the present Convention, there shall be set up:
(1) A European Commission of Human Rights hereinafter referred to as 'the
Commission';
(2) A European Court of Human Rights hereinafter referred to as 'the Court'."
Convention, supra note 3, art. 19.
26. J.E.S. FAWCETT, APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 321,
338 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987). Section III, articles 20-38, established the European
Commission of Human Rights and set out all matters pertinent to the purposes, requirements,
procedures, decisions, and jurisdiction of the Commission. Convention, supra note 3, arts. 20-38.
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and (2) the European Court of Human Rights.V7 Together, these bodies
make up the single most successful system and enforcement of
international law for the protection of human rights in the world.2 As
required by article 20 of the Convention, the European Commission of
Human Rights has the same number of Commissioners, or members, as
the number of contracting parties, and no two members may be from the
same State.29 The members of the Commission are elected by the
Committee of Ministers from a list of candidates compiled by the Bureau
of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.3" The
members are elected for a term of six years and may be re-elected.31
The Commission's role was originally to protect the judicial
function, specifically the work of the Court of Human Rights.32 The
Commission would filter out frivolous claims and act as the intermediary
between individuals, state governments, and the Court.33 At present,
the Commission's main functions include investigating alleged breaches
of the Convention and arranging for friendly settlements.' 4 Where
settlement is not feasible, the Commission writes up a report expressing
27. FAWCE r, supra note 26, at 385. Section IV, articles 38-56 set up the European Court
of Human Rights and all pertinent requirements for appointment, procedure, jurisdiction, decisions,
and authority of the Court. Convention, supra note 3, art. 38-56.
28. JANIS & KAY, supra note 4, at 1.
29. Convention, supra note 3, art. 20. For amendments to article 20 of the Convention, see
ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 389.
30. Convention, supra note 3, art. 21. Section III, article 21(1) and (2) state:
(1) The members of the Commission shall be elected by the Committee of Ministers by
an absolute majority of votes, from a list of names drawn up by the Bureau of the
Consultative Assembly; each group of the Representatives of the High Contracting Parties
in the Consultative Assembly shall put forward three candidates, of whom two at least
shall be its nationals.
(2) As far as applicable, the same procedure shall be followed to complete the
Commission in the event of other States subsequently becoming Parties to this
Convention, and in filling casual vacancies.
Id. For amendments to article 21 of the Convention, see ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 5,
at 390.
31. Convention, supra note 3, art. 22. Section III, article 22 provides in part:
(1) The members of the Commission shall be elected for a period of six years. They may
be re-elected. However, of the members elected at the first election, the terms of seven
members shall expire at the end of three years.
(2) The members whose terms are to expire at the end of the initial period of three years
shall be chosen by lot by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe immediately
after the first election has been completed.
Id. For the amendments to article 22 of the Convention, see ROBERTSON & MERRIl.S, supra note
5, at 390.
32. JANIS & KAY, supra note 4, at 39.
33. Id.
34. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 250. See also, JANIS & KAY, supra note 4, at
41.
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an opinion as to whether a violation of the Convention has occurred. 35
Any party to the Convention may bring an alleged violation by another
party to the attention of the Commission through the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe.36  The Commission receives petitions from
any person, group of persons, or non-governmental organization claiming
to be the victim of a violation of the Convention.37 However, article
26 states that the Commission may hear a complaint only after all
domestic remedies have been exhausted.3"
Historically, there were no formal requirements or qualifications of
the members of the Commission. However, in 1990, the Convention
was amended, and now requires that candidates for the Commission must
"be of high moral character and must either possess the qualifications
required for appointment to high judicial office or be persons of
recognised competence in national or international law. "3 Many of the
Commissioners are law professors, while others are retired from national
government, the judiciary, or university employment."
The European Court of Human Rights was also established by
article 19 of the Convention. Whereas the Convention serves as the
constitution of the Court, the Court acts to enforce the provisions of the
Convention.4' The jurisdiction of the Court extends "to all cases
concerning the interpretation and application of the present Convention
which the High Contracting Parties or the Commission shall refer to it,"
in accordance with article 48.42 Therefore, no cases are brought
35. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 250.
36. Convention, supra note 3, art. 24.
37. Id. art. 25(1). Section II, article 25(1) states in full:
The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the
rights set forth in this Convention, providing that the High Contracting Party against
which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognises the competence of
the Commission to receive such petitions. Those of the High Contracting Parties who
have made such a declaration undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise
of this right.
Id.
38. Id. art. 26. Section III, article 26 provides: "The Commission may only deal with the
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules
of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was
taken."
Id.
39. Convention, supra note 3, art. 21(3). See ROBERTSON & MERRIL.S, supra note 5, 390.
40. JANIs & KAY, supra note 4, at 40.
41. Id. at 87.
42. Convention, supra note 3, art. 45. Section IV, article 48 provides: "The following may
bring a case before the Court... (a) the Commission; (b) a High Contracting Party whose national
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directly before the Court, nor are they brought by individuals. Rather,
cases are referred to the Court by means of the Commission reports. 43
Moreover, the Court hears a case only after the Commission has decided
that a friendly settlement is impossible."
Structurally, the Court consists of nine judges45 who are elected by
the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly of the
Council of Europe.' Each member state nominates three candidates,
two of whom must be its own nationals.' This list constitutes the
ballot for judicial elections.'
Article 39(3) sets out the requirements for nomination. Similar to
the requirements of candidates for the Commission, judicial candidates
must be of high moral character and "must either possess the
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be
jurisconsults of recognized competence." 49 Candidates for the Court
are usually members of their national judiciary, professors of law,
practicing attorneys, former government officials, or politicians.'
There is no formal age requirement, however many judges become
members after retiring from the bench in their own country. Thus, their
is alleged to be a victim; (c) a High Contracting Party which referred the case to the Commission;
(d) a High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged." Id. art. 48.
43. Id. art. 44. Section IV, article 44 provides: "Only the High Contracting Parties and the
Commission shall have a right to bring a case before the Court." Id.
44. Id. art. 47. Section IV, article 47 provides that "It]he Court may only deal with a case
after the Commission has acknowledged the failure of efforts for a friendly settlement and within
the period of three months provided for in Article 32." Convention, supra note 3, art. 47.
45. Section IV, article 38 states: "The European Court of Human Rights shall consist of a
number of judges equal to that of the Members of the Council of Europe. No two judges may be
nationals of the same state." Id. art. 38.
46. Id. art. 39. Section IV, article 39 provides:
(1) The members of the Court shall be elected by the Consultative Assembly by a
majority of the votes cast from a list of persons nominated by the Members of the
Council of Europe; each Member shall nominate three candidates, of whom two at least
shall be nationals.
(2) As for applicable, the same procedure shall be followed to complete the Court in the
event of the admission of new Members of the Council of Europe, and in filling casual
vacancies.
(3) The candidates shall be of high moral character and must either possess the
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of
recognised competence.
Id.
47. Id.
48. Convention, supra note 3, art. 39.
49. Id.
50. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 5, at 297.
13 DICK. J. INT'L L. FALL 1994
age tends to be relatively high."' In fact, some members have been in
their late seventies or early eighties,2
Based on this brief explanation of the formation and function of the
Commission and the Court, it is possible to understand how these
institutions may unintentionally disadvantage women. Both forums are
made up almost entirely of experienced, well-respected, older members
of the international legal community. By function of both tradition and
qualification, most of these members are men. 3
III. Women's Rights Law as Human Rights Law
The protection of human rights on a global scale usually does not
include the protection of women's human rights. Although great strides
have been made in the furtherance of human rights and the dignity of the
individual, respect for these rights has not been universal.' Perhaps
this lack of universality is a result of the trend that offenses against
women are rarely characterized as human rights violations.55
Traditionally, human rights groups have been unwilling to address
violations of women's rights.56 In addition, women's groups have not
fully realized the availability of international law as a remedy against
such violations.' These misconceptions come with serious
consequences because they shape the way the international community
views and handles fundamental women's issues.5" Many violations of
women's human rights are directly related to being female. 9 The most
obvious offense is gender-based discrimination. 6
Since the middle of the 20th century, the international community
has continuously debated the future of human rights law and its impact
on the people of the world.6' However, very little of this debate ever
addressed issues of gender.62 Although unfortunate, it is not difficult
51. Id. at 297-98.
52. Id. at 298.
53. Doris Marie Provine, Revising Law's Boundaries: Women's Petitions to the European
Commission on Human Rights 6-7 (May 1992) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for presentation
at the 1992 annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
54. Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward, 15 HUM.
RTS. Q. 230. 231 (1990).
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Bunch, supra note 9, at 486.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Bunch, supra note 9, at 487.
62. Id.
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to understand how women could be left out of the movement to protect
human rights. After all, the entire system of international human rights
and the bodies that enforce the law of human rights were developed
primarily by men in a "male-oriented world."63 As a result, the law is
not "gender sensitive."'
Legal scholars offer some insight into the reasoning behind the
exclusion of women's issues in human rights law. When it was
suggested to governments and international organizations that women's
concerns deserved attention, justification for not addressing the issue was
their response.' These excuses suggest that the international
community believes sex discrimination is not as important as other more
traditional human rights concerns. 6 In addition, there is a prevailing
attitude that abuse of women is a private, cultural issue which does not
require or demand state action.67 Moreover, when the abuse of women
is actually recognized, "it is considered inevitable or so pervasive that
any consideration of it is futile."" It is precisely these attitudes that
prevent the full assimilation of women's rights into the collective human
rights agenda.
As a result of this global misunderstanding, it has been suggested
that a "recharacterization" of international human rights is necessary to
solve the women's rights dilemma.69 In particular, by encouraging a
greater female presence.on the Commission and the Court, specific
experiences of women would be included in the more traditional
approaches to human rights law in an attempt to "make women more
visible and to transform the concept and practice of human rights in our
culture so that it takes a better account of women's lives."7' That is,
by incorporating experiences unique to women, such as childbirth and
child rearing, the international system of human rights may better protect
women when their rights are compromised. The prerequisites for reform
may include: (1) improving education of human rights law and
processes; (2) providing legal services to specifically help women;
(3) researching facts and publishing the findings; and (4) promoting the
female presence on international human rights committees, courts, and
63. Cook, supra note 54, at 238.
64. Id.
65. Bunch, supra note 9, at 488.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Cook, supra note 54, at 238.
70. Bunch, supra note 9, at 487.
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commissions.7 The remainder of this Comment will focus on the last
of these prerequisites, namely the promotion of women to the European
Commission and Court.
In order to evaluate how a greater female presence on the
Commission and the Court would impact women's human rights
decisions, it is necessary to address several issues. First, one must
consider how the Law is a distinctively "male" phenomenon, with a
structure that has been characterized as "patriarchal."' In addition,
one must explore how the Law is traditionally structured in the
international context. Finally, one must recognize the various feminine
legal theories and how these theories may change the remedies available
to women before the Commission and the Court.
A. Female v. Male Law
The concept of Law is historically a "male" phenomenon. Men are
characterized as being rational, active, thinking, reasoning, powerful,
abstract, principled, and objective.73 Similarly, Law has been described
in the same manner.74 Conversely, women have been portrayed as
irrational, passive, feeling, emotional, sensitive, subjective,
contextualized, and personalized.75 It is not that these traits are
explicitly negative, rather it is that they are viewed, perhaps, as "less
strong."
Furthermore, there is a certain hierarchy between men and
women.76 Traditionally, women have been dominated and defined by
men.' In the real world, women are often exploited and oppressed,
71. Cook, supra note 54, at 259.
72. Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW - A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 453,
461 (David Kairys ed., 1990). "Patriarchy" is defined by Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary as "social organization marked by the supremacy of the father in the clan or family, the
legal dependence of wives and children, and the reckoning of descent and inheritance in the male
line." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 863 (9th ed. 1986).
73. Olsen, supra note 72, at 453.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 454. Birgit Brock-Utne states, "Though patriarchy is hierarchal and men of different
classes, races, or ethnic groups have different places in the patriarchy, they are united in their shared
relationship of dominance over their women." Birgit Brock-Utne, Women and Third World
Countries - What Do We Have in Common?, 12 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 500 (1989); Hilary
Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT. L. 613, 621 (1991).
77. Olsen, supra note 72, at 453. Historically, ideas about women, the family, and women's
relationship with the world outside the home have been used effectively to rationalize inequality.
Diane Polan, Toward a Theory ofLaw and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW - A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE, 294, 297 (David Kairys ed., 1982). This patriarchal idealogy has effectively convinced
women that their social, economic, and political subordination and feelings of inferiority are the
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while in the realm of fantasy they are placed on a pedestal, worshipped,
or treasured.78 However, it remains true that no matter how often men
extol the "virtues of women," society maintains that rational is better
than irrational, objectivity is better than subjectivity, active is better than
passive, and reason is better than feeling.79 As a result, the dominant
role in society has remained the man's role.
Although the image of Justice may be in the form of a woman,
popular idealogy states that Law is male, not female.' It is not
difficult to understand this correlation, because for years the social,
practical, and intellectual practices that comprise Law were dominated
almost exclusively by men."1
In this sense, the international arena is the same as the national one.
International law is also distinctly "male" in its approach.' The main
problem with international law is the difficulty in developing an
international feminist perspective.' The key to gaining such a
perspective requires looking behind the individual States and investigating
the actual impact of international law, as a whole, on the individual.'
By taking the women of the world more seriously and by understanding
the "skewed nature" of international law, feminist legal theory can
identify the possibilities for change.'
result of natural forces, rather than socially-imposed by the actions and opinions of men. Id.
78. Olsen, supra note 72, at 454. Consider the Greek and Roman goddesses, created in the
image of ideal beauty. Conversely, the women of ancient Greece and Rome toiled in the home and
fields, serving the male aristocracy of the Empire. Another example of this fantasy-world treatment
of women is our own traditional fairy tales. Snow White, Cinderella, and Sleeping Beauty were all
oppressed, yet they were oppressed by other women. The men in these stories, on the other hand,
adored the women and treasured their unparalleled beauty. Ironically, the men were characterized
as "knights in shining armor" or "Prince Charming" and lived to protect and free the women from
their misery. See Charles Perrault, Centrillon, in CINDERELLA - THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-
FIVE VARIANTS 342 (Marion Roalfe Cox ed., 1967); Jacob Grimm & Wilhelm Grimm, Little Briar
Rose (The Sleeping Beauty), in JACOB GRIMM AND WILHELM GRIMM AND OTHER GERMAN FAIRY
TALES 118 (Helmut Brackert & Volkmar Sander eds., 1985); Jacob Grimm & Wilhelm Grimm,
Little Snow-White, in JACOB GRIMM AND WILHELM GRIMM AND OTHER GERMAN FAIRY TALES 126
(Helmut Bracket & Volkmar Sander eds., 1985).
79. See Olsen, supra note 72, at 454.
80. Id. at 454.
81. Id. Olsen comments that the entire legal system has a "pervasive maleness" because law
is considered to be rational, objective, abstract, and principled. Id. at 461. "'The whole structure
of law - its hierarchal organization; its combative, adversarial format; and its undeviating bias in
favor of rationality over all other values - defines it as a fundamentally patriarchal institution.'"
Id. (quoting Polan, supra note 77, at 300, 302).
82. Charlesworth et al., supra note 76, at 621.
83. Id. at 614.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 615.
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Specifically, the content of international law and the law-making
process both favor men.' Such a phenomenon can be explained by the
way gender is characterized worldwide. Women are associated with an
"ethic of care."' This means that women view things in terms of
relationships, caring, responsibility, and communication.u In contrast,
men are traditionally aligned with the "ethic of right or justice." 9 This
ethic, comprised of fairness, logic, rationality, right versus wrong, and
winning versus losing,' ° serves as the cornerstone of the law.
Consequently, because gender is differentiated in this manner, the rules
of international law are structured more in line with those traits attributed
to men. Once again, Law is based on fairness, right versus wrong,
logic, winning versus losing, and rationality.9 Similarly, the law-
making process is structured to favor these masculine traits.'
In addition, legal scholars emphasize that the organizational
structure of international law also clearly reflects the male perspective
and ensures its continued patriarchal nature.93 Within the individual
state governments of Europe, "power structures are overwhelmingly
masculine."' They, reflect the patriarchal nature of their individual
State cultures." Within these national decision-making bodies, women
are almost always unrepresented or underrepresented. 96  The
concentration of control, power, and the use of force to maintain control
is harbored by a small, elite group. 7 It stands to reason, then, that
international organizations are patriarchal because they are a "mere
extension of the member states."98 Similar to the member states,
women are unrepresented or under-represented in the decision-making
bodies of the international organizations.'
86. Id. at 614-15.
87. Charlesworth et al., supra note 76, at 615.
88. Id.
89. Id. This goes back to the earlier discussion of the Olsen article which characterized men
as "rational, active, thinking, reasoning, powerful, objective, abstract, and principled". Olsen, supra
note 72, at 453.
90. Charlesworth et al., supra note 76, at 615.
91. See Olsen, supra note 72, at 461.
92. Id.
93. Charlesworth et al., supra note 76, at 622.
94. Id. at 621-22.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 622.
97. Id.
98. Charlesworth et al., supra note 76, at 622.
99. Id. Because their structures replicate national governments, international organizations
restrict women to insignificant or subordinate roles. Id. "Women are excluded from all major
decision making by international institutions on global politics and guidelines, despite the often
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Finally, the normative structure of international law has allowed
women's issues to be left unattended.I"° Because men are not
traditionally victims of gender discrimination, sexual degradation, or
domestic violence, these matters have been ignored within the
international community.'' The sphere of international law has been
divided into two areas: the "public realm" and the "private
realm."0 3 The "public realm" is associated with men and includes
law, economics, politics, and intellectual and cultural life. 4  The
"private realm," conversely, contains the home, hearth, children, and
family life.r"
Throughout history, a greater significance has been placed on the
public realm. " Generally, it has been deemed appropriate for the
State to intervene in the work place, the economy, and politics.
However, State intervention in the home and family has almost always
been regarded as taboo. 08 Therefore, it is logical that issues relating
to home life, and by association issues relating to women, are ignored by
the policy making bodies of the State."°9 In order to bring women's
disparate impact of those decisions on women." Id. at 623. For example, only one woman has
served as a judge on the International Court of Justice, and no woman has ever been a member of
the International Law Commission. Id. The United Nations, at the present rate of change, will take
40 more years to reach equal legal representation. Charlesworth et al., supra note 76, at 623.
100. Id. at 625.
101. Id. at 626.
102. Id. at 625-26. See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 829, 839 (1990). Bartlett quotes from Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873), where he sets forth the "separate spheres" theory as
follows:
mhe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization... indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.
Id. Although this opinion was composed in 1873, it is still this idealogy that hinders the cause of
women's rights worldwide.
103. Charlesworth et al., supra note 76, at 625-26.
104. Id. at 626.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 627.
108. Charlesworth et al., supra note 76, at 627.
109. Id. Although logical, it is not acceptable or appropriate that issues affecting women have
been summarily excluded from the normative structure of international law. This explanation allows
a better understanding of the difficulty of forming a "feminine perspective" of international rules and
the bodies that enforce these rules. Id. at 614.
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rights under the protection of general human rights, this distinction must
be eradicated.
B. Feminist Legal Theory
It is not surprising that because of their differences, men and women
have developed competing legal methodologies. Men have the tendency
to view law as a concept of steadfast rules and regulations. °"0 Women
approach the reasoning process differently."' Instead of generalizing
and holding fast to universal principles of law, women are more attentive
to individual situations. 112 Women recognize exceptions to the
universal principles." 3 This feminist legal theory is referred to as
"feminist practical reasoning.""' This theory can be applied to a
variety of areas of the law. However, it is most useful in situations
where it reveals gender-based discrimination within existing legal
principles and rules.'
A second feminist approach to law involves asking the "woman
question."" 6  This theory concentrates on analyzing the gender
implications of an established rule or practice." 7 The woman question
considers the following factors: (1) whether and how women have been
excluded from consideration; (2) how a specific oppression might be
corrected; and (3) what difference the correction would make. "8 By
asking and answering these questions, one can discover how the law fails
to include the values and experiences which are more typical of
women." 9 Accordingly, it also becomes clear exactly how women are
directly or indirectly disadvantaged by existing legal standards."2 By
exposing the underlying effects of the law on women, this method helps
to demonstrate how social structures implicitly render women different
and thereby, subordinate.''
110. Bartlett, supra note 102, at 849.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Women do not believe that "the practicalities of every day life" should be neglected
for the sake of abstract justice. Id. (citing M. BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE, AND MIND (1986)).
114. Bartlett, supra note 102, at 850.
115. Id. at858.
116. Id. at 837.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Bartlett, supra note 102, at 837. Bartlett claims that the "woman question" assumes that
some features of the law are not only non-neutral, but specifically "male". Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 843.
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The remainder of this Comment will apply the woman question and
feminist practical reasoning to selected decisions of the Commission and
the Court. The goal of the analysis is to explore the effect a stronger
female presence could have on the decisions of the Commission and the
Court and the availability of more effective remedies to the women of
Europe in the future.
IV. Women on the Commission and Court of Human Rights - A
Case Law Analysis
Male dominance in the area of international human rights is not
limited to decisions in their favor. I" In fact, the majority of all issues
that are decided begin with a man's, rather than a woman's, petition to
the Commission." Additionally, men have a higher degree of success
getting their applications admitted for an on-the-merits decision by the
Commission or the Court."2 These statistics are further evidence that
men and women are treated differently by the law."z  Perhaps by
electing women to the Commission and Court, European women would
feel more comfortable petitioning the Commission with their grievances,
hence more voices would be heard.
There are specific articles of the Convention that, when violated,
illustrate gross gender discrimination. Unfair treatment between male
and female petitioners occurs most frequently in cases involving privacy
and non-discrimination provisions,"' 6 namely articles 8,27 providing
122. Provine, supra note 53, at 22 (citing Erika S. Fairchild, Criminal Procedure and the
European Court of Human Rights (1991) (paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Law and
Society Association, June, 1991, on file with the author); Donald W. Jackson, Judging Human
Rights: The Formative Years of the European Court of Human Rights, 1959-1989 (1991) (paper
presented at the 15th IPSA world congress, July, 1991, on file with the author). See infra part VI
of this Comment.
123. Provine, supra note 53, at 22. For example, in 1989, 271 applications were filed with the
Commission. Id. at 23. Of these 271 applications, 43 were filed jointly by a man and a woman, 23
were filed by women, and 203 were filed by men. Id.
124. Id. In 1989, only seven percent of those cases brought by women were admitted for on-the-
merits review. Id. at 24.
125. See Provine, supra note 53, at 24.
126. Id. at 15.
127. Section I, article 8 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by the public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety, or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention, supra note 3, art. 8.
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a right to privacy, article 12,128 providing for the right to marry and
found a family, and article 14,129 prohibiting discrimination based on
sex, race, religion, language and the like. As the following cases
illustrate, these privacy and non-discrimination provisions have often
been used together to challenge rules related to reproductive freedom,
family welfare, and personal independence.
30
A. Cases Relating to Family Welfare
Johanna Airey, an Irish national, was the victim of domestic abuse,
for which her husband had been tried and fined.'13  In June 1972, Mr.
Airey left the family home permanently. 132  Because divorce is
prohibited in Ireland, Mrs. Airey's only available remedy was to obtain
a legally binding deed of separation, which would relieve the couple of
their obligation to co-habitate.'33 For eight years, Mrs. Airey tried to
secure a separation but was unable to find a solicitor who would take her
case. 134  Finally, on June 14, 1973, Mrs. Airey petitioned the
Commission."' Her complaint alleged breaches of the Convention
under articles 6, 8, 13, and 14.136
In its report of March 9, 1978, the Commission held that Ireland
violated article 6 of the Convention by not providing Mrs. Airey
effective access to the courts. 137  Although the decision was in her
128. Section I, article 12 provides: "Men and women of marriageable age have the right to
marry and found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right." Id.
art. 12.
129. Section I, article 14 states: " The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status." Id. art. 14.
130. Provine, supra note 53, at 15.
131. Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, 1977 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 180, 182 (Eur.
Comm'n on H.R.).
132. Airey, 1977 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 182.
133. VINCENT BERGER, CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 120
134. Id.
135. Airey, Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 186.
136. Airey, 1977 Y.B. Eur. Cony. H.R. at 184-86. BERGER, supra note 133, at 120.
137. Id. at 120 n.l. Section I, article 6 provides in part:
(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of a trial in the
interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to
the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
Convention, supra note 3, art. 6.
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favor, the Commission failed to examine her complaint under articles 8,
13, and 14. 3 Appropriate attention to article 8 required Ireland to
provide Mrs. Airey with a judicial separation, yet, after eight years, she
was still unable to obtain one. 39  The Commission recognized this as
a breach of the Convention. However, it failed to formally view Mrs.
Airey's complaint under that article."4  As such, the Commission
effectively denied legitimacy to Mrs. Airey's rights.
This case may have had full consideration if there were a greater
female presence on the Commission. The application of feminist legal
theory may have yielded a different point of view. Mrs. Airey's rights
were clearly denied proper consideration. Moreover, the Commission
summarily denied the petitioner consideration under articles 8, 13, and
14 because she was granted relief under article 6. This rationale
suggests that Airey's claims under the other three articles are
insignificant. Petitioner's rights under these articles are intrinsically
"female." That is, her rights were violated because she was a woman.
Perhaps this is the true reason they were not considered legitimate by the
Commission.
The first inquiry in the "woman question" approach is whether
women have been excluded from consideration under a certain law. In
this case, the petitioner was oppressed because she could not obtain
adequate relief under all articles of the Convention. The next step is to
determine how this problem might be corrected. By providing women
a forum that is representative of the population, their complaints may
gain legitimacy and may be treated with a greater degree of fairness.
That is, women on the Commission might view their complaints as
justified under articles 8, 13, and 14, thereby providing female
petitioners with a voice. However, this component of the woman
question presents a more difficult problem. It is easy to suggest that
138. BERGER, supra note 133, at 120 n.l.
139. Airey, Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 194, 200.
140. Incidently, the Court heard Mrs. Airey's case and issued its decision on 9 October, 1979.
BERGER, supra note 133, at 121. The Court held that Mrs. Airey was denied effect access to the
High Court of Ireland and therefore, there had been a breach of article 6(1) (5 votes to 2). Id. at
122-23. In addition, the Court found that she had been a victim of an article 8 violation (4 votes
to 3). Id. at 123. The Court held that "the existence of the remedy of judicial separation amounted
to a recognition that the protection of family or private life might sometimes necessitate spouses'
being relieved from the duty to live together." Id. Accordingly, effective respect for private life
obligated Ireland to provide recourse to anyone who may need it. Id. However, like the
Commission, the Court did not grant legitimacy to all of Mrs. Airey's complaints. BERGER, supra
note 133, at 123. It held that, in light of the above recognition, Mrs. Airey's complaints under
articles 13 and 14 did not warrant review (4 votes to 3). Id.
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female members would balance the odds, yet it is difficult in practice to
elect women to the Commission.'
4'
The third inquiry of the woman question explores whether the
suggested measures would exact a change. Electing women to the
Commission and the Court would add the female perspective necessary
to reform traditional human rights approaches. 42 Likewise, this would
make women more visible and would help "transform the concept and
practice of human rights in our culture so that it takes better account of
women's lives." 143  Perhaps a Commission comprised, at least in part,
of women would have granted all of Mrs. Airey's complaints legitimacy,
and thus, provided her with a more effective forum and remedy.
B. Cases Relating to Privacy in Sexuality and Reproductive Freedom
Cases involving a woman's right to privacy in her sexuality and
reproductive freedom have posed interesting problems for the Court and
the Commission. In X and Y v. The Federal Republic of Germany, two
female petitioners filed a complaint against the Federal Republic of
Germany, challenging the validity of its abortion statute.14 On June
18, 1974, the government of West Germany had passed a statute
providing for pregnancy counseling and containing new provisions of the
German Criminal Code concerning abortion. 45 The petitioners filed
their complaint alleging that the German court ruling upholding the
statute violated articles 8, 9, 12, and 11 of the Convention. *  The
petitioners alleged a violation of article 8 in that they were left with no
alternative but to abstain from intimate relations, use methods of
contraception of which they disapprove, or carry out a pregnancy against
their will. 47
141. See Provine, supra note 53, at 6. There are no formal requirements for membership.
However, tradition dictates that nominees have had distinguished legal careers before pursuing
election to the Commission and the Court of Human Rights. Id.
142. See Bunch, supra note 9, at 487.
143. Id.
144. X and Y v. the Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6959/74, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony.
on H.R. 382 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
145. Id. The Bundestag passed the Fifth Criminal Law Reform Act, which limits the period for
legal abortion to 12 weeks after conception. Id. at 384 (citing Federal Law Gazette, § 218(a)). It
also provides for legal abortion on specific grounds on the advice of a physician after the twelfth
week. Id. (citing Federal Law Gazette, § 218(b)).
146. Id. at 388. For purposes of this Comment, only articles 8 and 12 will be addressed. For
the text of article 8 and article 12, see supra notes 127 and 128, respectively.
147. Xand Y, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 388. The second petitioner further alleged that
the Convention was violated under article 12. Id. She reasoned that women with illegitimate
children have a lessor chance of getting married, and therefore, her future and enjoyment of life may
be limited by these laws of the State. Id.
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Regarding the alleged violation of article 8, the Commission
affirmed the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany,
holding that the statute does not interfere with the right to found a
family, nor the right to engage in family planning." The Commission
stated that the termination of an unwanted pregnancy was not an
acceptable form of "family planning," and therefore no rights had been
compromised. 1
49
Regarding article 12, the Commission held that the Convention
guarantees the right to marry, and that this right had not been violated
by Germany's federal court decision. 50 The Commission explained
that "[t]he chances of a person to marry, which depend on many
objective and subjective factors, are not, and cannot, be protected as
human rights."'"I
The right of reproductive freedom would benefit most from the
presence of the feminist perspective on the Commission and the Court.
In this particular case, the petitioners would probably still be denied
relief under article 12 because the application of the "marriage" principle
is tenuous, at best. However, the Commission's analysis of article 8
may have been different with the insight of more female members.
Laws restricting a person's reproductive freedom may be construed
as intrinsically gender-biased because women are the only members of
society who may become pregnant. 5 2 Although this Comment is not
suggesting that men are wholly insensitive to the situation, it is
reasonable to suggest that women have an easier time relating to the
concepts of pregnancy and its impact on a woman's life.
By applying feminist practical reasoning to the abortion debate, it
is possible to see how this area of international law should not be one
composed of bright line rules. The feminist practical reasoning
approach, as discussed earlier, concentrates more on situation and
context, rather than universal principles and generalization.5 3 Because
of the sensitive nature of reproduction issues, a case-by-case analysis
148. Id. at 392.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 394.
151. Xand Y, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 394 (emphasis added).
152. See Provine, supra note 53, at 19. A later case reexamined whether abortion came under
the protection of article 8's privacy guarantee. Id. Once again, the Commission held that it did not.
Id. See Bruggemann and Scheuten v. the Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6959/75, 10 Eur.
Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 100 (1978). Because of the State's legitimate interest in the pregnancy,
the Commission reasoned that privacy rights do not include a decision to choose abortion. Provine,
supra note 53, at 20.
153. Bartlett, supra note 102, at 849.
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may be a more appropriate approach. Compare the previous case to this
next example.
For a decade after the case of X and Y, virtually no abortion cases
came before the Commission or the Court." However, in 1988, an
Irish case, Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Women Centre
Ltd. and Others v. Ireland, raised the issue of freedom of information
regarding abortion.'55 The case was brought before the Commission
by two pregnancy counseling services.'56 The services alleged an Irish
Supreme Court decision, banning the distributing of abortion material,
violated articles 8, 10, and 14 of the Convention.157 The Commission
held that the law did contravene article 10.158 However, it failed to
grant relief under the right to privacy or on the grounds of
discrimination. 159
The incident that initiated Open Door Counselling Ltd. involved a
14-year-old girl who was raped, impregnated, and then compelled by the
Irish authorities to have the baby. ' ° The case was eventually brought
before the Court on March 24, 1992 and was heard by a panel of twenty
three judges.' 6  The panel was composed of one woman and twenty-
two men. 6 2  The Court, like the Commission held that the Irish
Supreme Court injunction was violative of article 10, but the complaints
did not merit review under articles 8 and 14.63 Perhaps a Court
comprised of a more representative panel would yield a more favorable
outcome. Further, cases of this nature may be viewed more fairly and
on a case-by-case basis.
Feminist practical reasoning may be employed here to analyze the
impact of this particular case. Common sense dictates that a 14-year-old
girl, impregnated against her will and forced to have the baby, is a
grotesque violation of one's dignity and rights as a woman. This
conclusion does not require a feminist perspective. Open Door
Counselling Ltd. '64 is an ideal example of men's tendencies to rely on
bright line rules and principles of law. That is, the fact that Ireland has
154. See Provine, supra note 53, at 20.
155. Id. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd. and Others v.
Ireland, App. Nos. 14234/88 & 14235/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 131 (1991) (Commission report).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 135.
158. Id. at 136-38. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 10.
159. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 139-40.
160. Provine, supra note 53, at 25.
161. Id. See Open Door Counselling Ltd., 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 244.
162. Provine, supra note 53, at 25.
163. Id. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 268, 270.
164. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 15 Eur. H.R. Rep at 244.
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such a law dictates the outcome of the case. No alternative relief is
available, regardless of the circumstances. A more balanced Commission
and Court may have given greater credence to the perspective of the
victim and allowed for an "exception to the rule" line of reasoning.
In direct contrast to these two privacy cases is the case of Norris v.
Ireland.165 The Norris case brought the issue of homosexuality before
the Court.166 Mr. David Norris is an active homosexual who had been
campaigning for gay rights in Ireland since 1971.167 In November
1977, Norris sought a declaration in the Irish High Court that sections
61 and 62 of the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861, and section 11
of the Criminal Law Act 1885, were unconstitutional. 68  Both
provisions criminalized homosexual activity and included penalties of
imprisonment. 1
69
In October 1983, Mr. Norris filed a complaint with the Commission
claiming that the Irish laws violated article 8 of the Convention. 7
The Commission referred the case to the Court.' 7' The Court held that
the laws criminalizing and punishing homosexual behavior were violative
of the Convention. 72 However, under article 8, interference in one's
private life is permitted if a legitimate State interest is involved. 173  The
Irish Government advanced the argument that these laws were for the
purpose of protecting the morals of the State. 74 The Court rejected
this rationale and held that national officials did have the authority to
165. Norris v. Ireland, 1988 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 163 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 164.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 164. Mr. Norris' complaint was dismissed by the Irish High Court on 10 October,
1980. Norris, 1988 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 164. On April 22, 1983 the Irish Supreme Court
upheld the High Court's earlier decision. Id.
170. Id. Mr. Norris contended that by criminalizing homosexual activity, the laws interfered
with his right to respect for private life. Id. The Commission held his petition to be admissible, and
in its report of 12 March, 1987, the Commission held the Irish laws to be in breach of article 8. Id.
171. Norris, 1988 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 165.
172. Id.
173. Id. Section I, article 8 provides in pertinent part:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary . . . in the interest of national
security, public safety, or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
Convention, supra note 3, art. 8 (emphasis added).
174. Norris, 1988 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at.165. The Government further argued that "the
moral fibre of a democratic nation is a matter for its own internal institutions." Id. Accordingly,
the Government should be allowed a degree of tolerance in its compliance with article 8. Id.
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regulate matters of morals, yet this regulation was by no means
unlimited. 75
In recent years, the Irish authorities had not enforced these laws as
to private acts between consenting adult males. 76 The Court noted that
there had been no injurious effect on the moral standards in Ireland, nor
was there a need for a stricter enforcement of the rule. " Therefore,
it could not be supported that there was, in fact, a "pressing social need"
for the statute.7I As a result of this finding, the Court held by eight
votes to six, that the law was violative of article 8 of the European
Convention. "
It is unnecessary, for purposes of this Comment, to analyze the
Norris"s case under feminist legal theory because the Court reached an
equitable conclusion. In all likelihood, a Court comprised of both men
and women would have arrived at the same, or a similar, holding. The
result of the case is fair and upholds the very ideals embodied in the
European Convention. However, the reasoning of the Court in
Norris' is quite inconsistent with that of Open Door Counselling
Ltd.182 Both cases were filed under the same theory, and the State
advanced the exact same defense. In Open Door Counselling Ltd.,
Ireland claimed that the federal statutes did not violate the Convention
because there was a legitimate State interest - to protect the moral fibre
of the nation. 8 3 In effect, this legitimate interest gave the Government
authority to interfere with the private business of the petitioners. In
Norris, the Court held that the State's interest was not legitimate and the
statute was violative of the Convention." Conversely, in Open Door
Counselling Ltd., the Commission held that the interests of the State
were sufficient to justify intervention."'5 The Court also held that the
abortion statute was not in violation of article 8.'1 It is worth noting
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Norris, 1988 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 165.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 166.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 131 (Commission report); 15 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 244.
183. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 14 Eur. H.R.Rep. at 141. (Commission report); 15 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at 263.
184. Norris, 1988 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 165-66.
185. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 100, 140 (Commission report). See
also Provine, supra note 53, at 20.
186. Open Door Counselling Ltd., 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 246, 268.
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that the petitioner in Norris"'7 was a man, while the petitioner in Open
Door Counselling Ltd. 8' represented a woman's interest. This is a
blatant example of the disparity between the remedies available to men
and those available to women before the tribunal. Once again, by
providing a forum of equal representation, inconsistencies such as this
may occur less frequently, or perhaps not at-all. With respect to privacy
and reproductive freedom, women need a louder voice on the
Commission and the Court of Human Rights.
C. Cases Relating to Citizenship
The case law suggests that there has also been discriminatory
treatment of citizenship cases. The most noted violations have occurred
in the United Kingdom. 9 It was an established practice to allow male
resident aliens to legally bring their spouses into the country, but female
resident aliens were not provided the same opportunity. 9 , The
following case, Mrs. Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United
Kingdom, abolished this discriminatory practice.' 9 '
In Mrs. Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali, the petitioners filed a
complaint against the United Kingdom claiming that the country's
immigration laws violated articles 8 and 14 of the Convention."9 All
three petitioners had lived in the United Kingdom since the 1960s or
1970s, and all had been given leave to remain there indefinitely by the
British Government."' The legislation dictated that a foreign husband
187. Norris, 1988 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 165.
188. Open Door.Counselling Ltd., 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 131 (Commission report); 15 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 244.
189. See Provine, supra note 53, at 18.
190. Id. Over 100 cases were brought before the Commission challenging this rule. Id. The
Commission chose to hear three of them. Id.
191. Mrs. Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 1985 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on
H.R. 184 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
192. Id. In addition, the complaint alleged violations of articles 3 and 13, however, these will
not be discussed in this Comment.
193. Id. at 184-85. Mrs. Nargis Abdulaziz has lived in the United Kingdom, with leave, since
1977. Id. at 184. In May 1979, she was given leave to remain there indefinitely. Id. In December
of the same year, Mrs. Abdulaziz married Mr. Abdulaziz, a Portuguese national. Abdulaziz, 1985
Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 184. Mr. Abdulaziz had emigrated to the United Kingdom where he
was granted leave to remain for a limited period. Id. In July 1980, after his marriage, he was
denied leave to remain permanently. Id.
Mrs. Arcley Cabales has lived in the United Kingdom, with leave since 1967, she was given
leave to remain indefinitely in June of 1971. Id. In 1980, she married Mr. Cabales, a Philippine
citizen, in the Philippines. Id. In February 1981, the British authorities refused him a visa to join
Mrs. Cabales for settlement in the United Kingdom. Abdulaziz, 1985 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at
184. In 1984, Mrs. Cabales obtained naturalization as a British citizen. Id. at 185. Once again,
her husband was denied leave to settle on the grounds that the Philippine marriage was invalid. Id.
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would not be granted leave to enter or stay unless his wife was a citizen
of the United Kingdom, and one of her parents had been born in the
United Kingdom."9 In 1983, this law was amended to require that the
wife be a British citizen."9 The birthplace of her parents was no
longer relevant." Conversely, a foreign wife could obtain leave to
enter or stay whether or not her husband was a British citizen with the
territorial birth link."9  Since 1983, the parental birth link is not
required. 9
In this case, the Court refused relief under article 8,1' but did
enter judgment in favor of the petitioners under article 14. 200 The
Court concluded that the enforcement of the immigration regulation
resulted in differential treatment on the basis of gender."' Because
there was no evidence of an "objective and reasonable" justification, the
Court held the immigration policy to be discriminatory.' Although
the law was struck down for violating the Convention, it was in effect
until 1985.203 Certainly similar situations had occurred in the United
In January 1985, the couple was married in the United Kingdom and Mr. Cabales was given a
twelve month leave. Id. At the end of that period, Cabales would have be eligible for leave to
remain there indefinitely. Id.
Mrs. Sohair Balkandali has lived in the United Kingdom, with leave, since 1973. Abdulaziz,
1985 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 185. Mrs. Balkandali was granted leave to remain indefinitely
and citizenship, after she married a British national in 1978. Id. That marriage has subsequently
dissolved. Id. In 1981, she married Mr. Balkandali, a Turkish citizen, who was in the United
Kingdom without leave. Id. In May of the same year, Mr. Balkandali applied for leave and was
denied. Id. However, by subsequent legislation, his wife became a British citizen, and as the
husband of a citizen he was granted limited leave in 1983, and permanent leave in 1984. Abdulaziz,
1985 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 185.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Abdulaziz, 1985 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 185.
199. Id. at 185-86. The Court rejected the petitioners' argument regarding the violation of
article 8. Id. at 185. While realizing that the article serves to protect the well-being of the family,
the Court refused to extend it to include the obligation to respect a married couple's choice of
residence. Id. at 186. At the time of their application for review, the petitioners failed to show that
there were obstacles to establishing a home life in their husbands' countries, and therefore there had
been no lack of respect by the British authorities and no violation of article 8. Id.
200. Abdulaziz, 1985 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 186-87.
201. Id.
202. Id. The Court pointed out that it was considerably easier for a man, settled in the United
Kingdom, to obtain permission for his non-national spouse to enter into or remain in the country.
Id. at 186. The State contended that the law was designed to protect the labor market at a time
when there was very high unemployment. Id. Realizing the legitimacy of the State's interest, the
Court maintained that the justification was not "weighty" enough to circumvent article 14.
Abdulaziz, 1985 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 186.
203. Although the law was determined to be violative of the Convention, England chose to deny
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Kingdom prior to the early 1980s.1  This may serve as another
example of how women's issues are treated with less immediacy and less
vigor.
It is possible that the Commission and the Court would have dealt
with this issue sooner had they been composed of men and women
equally. Had the women of England believed that they had advocates on
the Court, they may have been more apt to file a petition earlier. Under
feminist legal theory, this immigration policy would have been identified
as discriminatory by application of the woman question. Applying this
theory, one would have asked whether women have been left out of
consideration. In the instant case, the answer is clearly "yes." Second,
one would inquire as to how this oppression might be corrected. The
Court, comprised of men and women, would have corrected the problem
by holding the British immigration regulations in violation of the
Convention.' Finally, this theory inquires whether it would make a
difference to render the regulations discriminatory. The answer is
simple. By concluding that the regulation is discriminatory, women
would be afforded the same opportunity to choose where they would like
to settle and raise a family. Women would have the same options that
men have been entitled to for years.'
It is also arguable that with a representative Commission and Court,
petitioners' complaint under article 8 would have received different
consideration. By applying the feminist practical reasoning theory, the
Court may have considered the family situations of the petitioners
individually. The decision to stay in the United Kingdom may have a
significant effect on one's family life. Should the authorities refuse
petitioners' request for leave to remain, they may have no other
alternative. Had the petitioners no option but to live in England without
their spouses, their respect for and right to family life is, in effect,
compromised.'
the benefit previously afforded to resident husbands rather than extend it to resident wives. Provine,
supra note 53, at 18. In effect, the law is now in accordance with the Convention. However, no
benefit may be derived by anyone. Id.
204. Mrs. Abdulaziz applied to the Commission on December 11, 1980. BERGER, supra note
133, at 293. Mrs. Cabales and Mrs. Balkandali applied on August 10, 1981. Id.
205. This Comment recognizes that the Court did hold the regulation in violation of the
Convention. However, it suggests that with equal representation the issue would have been resolved
prior to 1985.
206. This is true in theory, however, for purposes of this case, see supra notes 189-207 and
accompanying text.
207. This argument is purely hypothetical because the petitioners did not offer evidence that
suggested this as their only alternative. The feminist practical reasoning approach would handle such
complaints on a case-by-case basis, rather than applying a broad-based rule. See Bartlett, supra note
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V. Conclusion
The concept of human rights has come of age over the past fifty
years. However, as to women's rights, it is still in its infancy. Equal
representation on the European Commission and Court of Human Rights
would provide a more effective forum for the discussion of women's
human rights issues. A tribunal representing both men and women would
provide insight into the daily experiences of women, and allow the
impact of international rules to be viewed up close, rather than at a
distance.
Although the Commission and Court are an effective means to a
positive end, there is always room for change. The biggest obstacles are
the patriarchy of Law, and the masculine tradition of the Commission
and Court. However, increasingly, women are joining the professional
ranks in Europe. They are achieving positions of distinction and the pool
of distinguished candidates is growing. Soon, the advocates so badly
needed by the women of Europe will be available to serve on the Court
and the Commission. Will it be soon enough?
Kathleen M. McCauley
102, at 849.
